Introduction
Papers aboutpolitics and religion all too often start with areference to the return of religion to the public sphere or as imilar observation. Thef act that social scientists are eager to write about politics and religion confirmsand reinforces this development. When talking about religion and representation,t his is no exception. Within the liberal democratic setting that coined most Europeanstates in their more recent history,r eligionp layed am inor role in the sphere of formal politics.Avarietyo fd evelopments,a mong them the diversification of religious landscapes,t he prominence of religious fundamentalism and religiously motivated violence,growingpublicresentments against somereligious groups,and the (re-)discovery of religion as ar esource for voter mobilization,b rought religion high on the political agenda.
This politicization of religion happens while political representation, as a centralc oncept of democracy,i su nder multiple pressures.T he crisis of representation, which is debated in this issue,relates to religion in avarietyofways,but as neither religion, nor representation, are enclosed concepts,itisacomplex task to pin them down.O nt he one hand, liberal democratic representation aims to includeand mirror societal diversification,also with regards to religion. On the other,religionand the claim for religious representationare usedinrhetoric to preventt his inclusion. What is more,t he inner diversity of religions makes an apparently simple category of difference difficult to represent and the neutrality mandate of the liberal state prevents state actors from taking sides,a tl east in theory.
In this paper, Iw ant to ask how religion relates to the idealistic concept of liberaldemocratic representation and its inherent pitfalls,and which underlying problems of liberal democratic representation are understood with the help of the case of politicized religion. Thep aper proceedsa sf ollows: First, Iw ill present concepts of political representation, in particular the political system centered approach by HannaF .P itkin and Michael Sawardsi dea of discursive representation. This conceptual introduction will be followed by ad iscussion of the pitfalls of liberaldemocratic representation in times of diversifying societies.Ina third part, Id iscuss religion and the crisis of representation, using the Austrian example as ap articularly information-rich case,s uited for purposeful sampling (Patton1999). In this third part, Iwill introduce the case of political representation in Austria, present the empirical data base and discuss the particular role of religion along the empirical results and the theoretical concepts of Pitkin and Saward. In ac oncluding discussion, Ia rgue that the current crisis of political representation is first and foremost acrisis of liberalism and thereforeaquestion of competingnorms.
Conceptualizing Liberal Democratic Political Representation
When talking about ac risis of liberal democraticr epresentation, it is useful to distinguish the three concepts involved. Representation and its theorization predate democratic systems.A lthough representation is nowadays mostly discussed in democratic settings,i ti si ni tself not bound to democracy.T homas Hobbes as one of the mostinfluential thinkers of political representation argued his Leviathan not at all in ad emocratic perspective,b ut it is still discussed by scholars of representation (Hobbes1 651;R unciman2 010). Democracy,m ost basically understood as ap olitical system whose members exercisep ower collectively,can hardly be thought of withoutany form of political representation. Usually,votingisthe mechanism to install "a necessarycorrespondence between acts of governance and the equallyweighted felt interests of citizens with regardto these acts" (Saward 1998, 1) . Such voting also takes place in amere issue oriented direct democratic setting. In reality, even political systems with well-developed direct democratic instruments are representatived emocracies,a st hey install representatives to govern beyond referenda. Political systems that are further characterized by the acceptance of humanrights,the rule of law and its emphasis on the individual as holder of rights and the normative goal of striving towards equality among,a nd freedom for,t heir members can be considered liberald emocracies (Kelly 2005) . Representation in liberaldemocracies and its proclaimed crisis is this papers focus.
One of the most well-known scholars in this debate is HannaF.Pitkin, who calls representation "the making presentinsomesense of something which is nevertheless not presentliterally or in fact" (1967, 8) . This approachtorepresentation is rooted in formerly religious references that have increasingly been understood as political. In ademocracy,the something that is not present is the sovereignty of the people,meaningthe shared powerofthe members of the democraticentity,which is not embodied or personalized. Classical questions that theories of political representation consider in this process are what makes aperson or institutionand their actions representative and for whom or what (individuals, groups,interests, etc.) .
Following Hannah F. Pitkin, we can differentiate between formalistic,s tanding-for (descriptive and symbolic) and substantiver epresentation 1 .F ormalistic representation refers to authorization and accountability of representation. While authorization is central to any form of representation, it is not ad istinct process.N ot every authorized persona cts as ar epresentative,w hich makes authorization anecessary condition but not an exclusive marker for representation. Even non-democratic representation requires authorization. Pitkin pointso ut that Hobbes concept of representation can be understood as an authorization concept, but remains essentially anti-democratica so nce authorized, ar epresentative cannot be held accountable (Pitkin 1967; Runciman 2009, 16) . Forpolitical representation to function democratically, representatives must be accountable for their acts.Through the possibility of sanctioning, responsiveness is formally established.
Descriptive representation looks at the extent to which representatives mirror the characteristics of their representees(aterm used by Pettit 2009) and usually 1O ther authors discuss representation along the linesofsimulative,enactive,interpretive representation (Pettit 2010) ;standing,acting and speakingfor someone );F or an excellent overview of different concepts see Dovi 2017. refers to categories of difference,s uch as gender,a ge,e thnicity,l anguage,s kin color, sexualo rientation, class,e tc. Accuracy of resemblance is the ideal of descriptive representation. Jane Mansbridge describes descriptive representationas representation by representatives who are "in their own persons and lives in some sense typical of the larger class of persons whomt hey represent" (1999,6 29) . Thereby she wants to point out that descriptive representation is not necessarily limited to outward criteria but also involvess hared experiences,l ike ac ertain profession.For federalpolitical systems,regional representation is usually also an important descriptive issue.Particularly in feminist theories of representation, the issue of descriptive likeliness received great attention. Thepresence of women in representative functions is al ong standing claim (Campbell, Childs,a nd Lovenduski2010) ;one that has been extended to minorities and marginalizedsocietal groups.
Pitkin discusses symbolic representationasecond aspect of "standing for" representation. She describes it as the meaningrepresentees ascribe to the representatives. Whether arepresentee identifies with arepresentative because they share features or for any others ymbolic ascription is irrelevant, as symbolic representation happens on the level of emotions (Stokke and Selboe2 009, 59 ). This aspect relates to non-formalistic ways of authorization. As representees are not involved in acts of representation, their non-objection functions as some kind of presence in absence,asDavid Runciman argues (2009, 94) . Ascribed meaning and the acceptance related to it is then acrucialelement to stabilizethe processof representation.
Substantiverepresentation refers to actions of representatives and the extent to which they serve the interests of the represented. Such interestrepresentation is then the most straight-forward aspect of representation. Pitkin assumes,i na rather essentialist manner,t he presence of social groups withins ociety whose interests can be fed into the political process.T his involves ag eneral responsiveness to groupneeds as well as the according voting behavior.Interests, in Pitkinsview,are relatively stable and given, something that can be picked up for the purpose of representation.
There is an ongoing debate on how standing-forand substantiverepresentation relate.O lder socials cientific studies have already shown that femaler epresentatives do not necessarily act according whati su nderstood as womensi nterests (Diamond1 977). Clearly,f emaler epresentatives are not necessarily feminist representatives.Infact, not only mediating factors,such as party political logics and institutional norms, might preventt hem from doing so,b ut differing political attitudescan be areasonfor female representatives not to act in whatis identified as the substantive interests of women (Celisa nd Childs 2012). Still, scholars like Iris Marion Young (Young 2002) , Jane Mansbridge (Mansbridge 1999) and Michelle L. Swers (Swers 2002) have demonstrated how descriptive representation of women has effects beyond the most directaspect of "acting for", namelyraising responsiveness to womensinterest on amore generallevel, and most importantly the inclusion of women into the circle of those perceived as able to rule.
Pitkinswork is still ausefulstarting point when thinking about representation. Her differentiation of aspectso fr epresentation is aw ell-structured approach, useful to analyze different facets of political representation. There is,h owever, severe criticism concerning the accuracy of approaches to representation that focus closely on the political system and its institutions and understandr epresentation as aprincipal agent relationship (Severs and Dovi 2018, 309) . Pitkins essentialistview on bothgroups and interests is definitelyoutdated.
Following the cultural turn in social sciences, groups are rather understood in the sense of imagined communities than as boundedentities (Anderson 1991). Equally,amore complex understanding of political processes includesthe making of both interestsa nd groups in the course of representation, rather than their given presence (Celis and Childs 2012). Thep erformative act of representation constitutes and constructs political realities (Diehl 2015, 10) . Such discursive views understand representation as "a practice in which the object of representation and the grounds on which it is defended, co-determine who and what is considered politically legitimate and how interests are to be represented" (Crivits et al. 2018, 475) .
As much as Pitkinswork is central to political system centeredapproaches to representation, Michael Sawardsw ork is central to the scholarly debate about discursive representation. In his book "The representative claim", Saward put forwardaconstructivist understanding in studying representationa nd suggests focusing on discursive representation and claims-making instead of investigating representation as ap rincipal agent relationship (2010).H is arguments also strongly built on the disability of political system focused approaches to grasp power relations and the (non-)representation of marginalized groups, non-state centered, international forms of representationsand dynamicsofrepresentation. In short, Saward and scholars of discursive representation increasingly try to avoid the shortcomings of standard accountso fd emocratic representation (Urbinati and Warren 2008) by perceiving discursive acts,d efined as claims, as representation.
This way of thinking denies theorists the possibility to identify what the interests of representees are and, in consequence the assessment of their representation. Only the perception of representees with regardtorepresentative acts can be assessed.Inthis perspective,also representatives are not concerned with makingc laims according to womenso rw orkersi nterests but aim at making claims that resonate amongtheir voters.The conditions in which these claimsare made are then the focus in analyzing discursive representation.
Despite ah eavy reception, Michael Sawards" representativec laim" is considered as adead end by some scholars.T he constructivist perspective does not allow the identification of interests and therebyq uestions every concept of democratic representationa nd, in consequence,t he possibility of democratic politics itself (Disch 2015) . Such contrasting of apolitical system orientation and a discursive approachishardly fruitful. Rather, Isuggestcombining these ways of thinking to enhance the standard perspectiveonpolitical representation. Saward himself points out "that democratic representation contains,but is not exhausted by,the familiar machinery of liberal representative democracy" (2012, 78) . And, although national political systemshave lostpower to corporations,civil society and supra-national political actors,they are far from being irrelevant.
Ac ombination of both perspectives is useful when we look at the different aspectsofrepresentation and their crises.Therefore,Iwill stick to Pitkinsconcept in structuringthis article but include awider understanding of representation than that as aprincipalagent-relationship.Informed by the constructivist perspective on groups and interest, Ia nalyze the crisis of representation along standard procedures of political representation in aliberaldemocratic setting.
Problems of Liberal Democratic Representation
If we ask for the crisis of political representation, we find pressing issues for each of the aspectsofrepresentation described by Hanna Pitkin that relate inherently to the concept of representation, triggered by recent societalt ransformation processes.While these transformations are not the only possible way in which the concept of political representation might be challenged, their current dense constellation leads to aperception of crisis.
a) FormalRepresentation
Regarding formal representation, elections as an institution to grant both authorization and accountability is delegitimized by agrowinggap between those who are involved in decision making and thosethat are affected.T his boundary problem (Dahl 2000; Goodin 2007; Gruber and Walter 2013) is both the result of increasing numbers of residents who are not citizens and shrinking voting rates due to decreasing interest in "mainstreamrepresentative politics" (Saward 2010 , 1) on the nation state level.
2 Here lies the first currently pressingproblem of the concept of liberal democratic political representation, as formal representation in aliberal democracy strives for widestinclusion to grant equality.Those affected by representative acts shouldbeinvolved in authorization processesand be able to hold representatives accountable.
As DavidRunciman discusses,this accountability is crucial to the very concept of representation, as the representedb ecome somewhat present only through their ability to object:"Representation implies that the representeddonot merely bear the consequences of anothersaction, but have some presence in the action 2A uthorization and accountability are also achallengeonaglobal scale,ascurrently most evident in climate politics (see for example Caney 2005). itself by dint of this fact. In other words,they must be capable of asserting their stake." (2007, 96) This is not the case whensignificant parts of the population are excluded from both aspects of formal representation or refuse to participate.
Theq uestion of how the electorate is constituted and whoi sa ctually( not) voting has become ever morep ressing over the past years.T he number of residents whoare not entitled to voteisrising due to migration movements and small naturalization numbers,which results in acrisis of representation (see Bauböck and Carens 2018) . ForAustria,the share of foreign citizensgrew from 8.6 percent in 1999 to 15.3 percentin2017, 3 and similar trends are observable across Western Europe. In cities,t hese numbers are usually higher and in particularly diverse areas,t hose entitled to vote are onlyathin majority.I nt he Austrianc apital Vienna, the share of foreign citizens is on average 25 percent and as high as 42.8 percent in some districts (Rudolfsheim-Fünfhaus) 4 . Another aspect that limits representativeness in aformalistic sense is citizens who do not exercisetheir right to vote.Asthey are not formally excluded from participation, falling turnouts are also am atter of symbolic representation and will be discussed below. From the perspective of formal representation, both the exclusion of larger shares of the population and the refusal to participate are not foreseen and limit the legitimacy of liberal democraticp olitical representation.
b) Descriptive Representation
Descriptive representationi sachallenged concept as migration processes and changing perceptions of difference result in ongoing diversification both in width and in depth. In the debateover descriptive representation, scholars distinguish microcosmica nd selective approaches.W hile the former aims at an exact mirroring of the total population and can only be achieved throughlottery,the latter is the reality of liberald emocratic representation. "In the far moref requent selective form of descriptive representation, institutional design gives selected groupsg reater descriptive representation than they would achieve in existing electoral systemsi no rder to bring the proportions of those groups in the legislature closer to their percentages in the population." (Mansbridge 1999, 633) . For most parts of Europe,c urrent informal section criteriar esult in an over-representation of males,t he highly educated,w hite people and ac ertain age group.
Despite the growing acceptance for the representation of some group characteristics,there is little reason for enthusiasm.Descriptive representation follows larger societal trendsr egarding the perception and acceptance of diversity. For example,changingsocietalstands (as well as significant courtrulings) on diversity allow for more visibility of somegroups(especiallywomen and LGBTQ people, see Reynolds 2013; Wängnerud 2009 ). Although womensvoting rights are well established by now,C uba (49 percent), Bolivia (51 percent)a nd Rwanda (63 percent) are the only countries in the world that reach arepresentationofwomen in parliament that matches the population (data.worldbank.org). Regarding other forms of diversity,especially concerning markers of difference that relate to migration, it seems acceptance for descriptive representation remains low.
As Iris Marion Young pointedout, the descriptive likeliness of representatives is crucial for democratic inclusion but any group inclusion bears the danger of excluding another (2002, 87 f.) . Which markerofdifference is the mostimportant to be mirroredi np olitical representation?G ender, religion, age,r egion, language,c lass?A nd when,i fa ta ll, can we assume commoni nterests of woman, homosexuals,P rotestantChristians,b est agers, Ty rolianys,Carinthian Slovenes, constructionw orkers?T he vast literature on "groupism", "imagined communities" and intersectionality discusses the multiple ways in which descriptive representationtherefore clearly has limits (Gold and Haynie 2014; Brubaker2002; McCall 2005) .
This further relates to ac rucial point for the following discussiono fl iberal democratic representation:Descriptive likeliness relates to groupcharacteristics and thereby group representation. Thel iberal democratic concept by contrast, puts the individual at the center of political representation, which brings along the challenge of weighingi ndividual and group interests.S ome individuals will experience inequality due to group membership,w hether or not these groupsa re imagined or ascribed. Also to guarantee freedom might require acknowledging group needs,asthe examplesofreligious freedom and the non-discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation show.Ignoringgroups therefore undermines the liberalgoals of equalityand freedom. Governinggroupsbycontrast always limits the fundamental liberal democratic focus on the individual as bearer of equal rights. Theinherent dilemma of descriptive representationcan then be subsumed as the most likely permanent inabilitytomirror societaldiversity in its fluidity and multitude,while at the sametime,such mirroring is needed to preventexclusion. Growing numbers of characteristicspeople claim representation for,aswell as a refusal to allow for the representation of some characteristics,results in avirulent problemand contribute to the currentcrisis of representation.
c) Symbolic Representation
Thesymbolic view on representation looks at the meaningpeopleascribe to their representatives.H ere,w es imultaneously observe ag rowing disaffection from formal politicsa nd the increasing success of politicians of populist and authoritarian style who push for asymbolic charging of the nation (Beyme2018). Both developments are symptoms of acrisis of representation.
Identification with political parties that where formative for many post-war European democracies hasb een declining for decades now.I nm any cases,p olitical parties used to have an all-encompassing agenda for their partygoers life courses (Andeweg and Farrell 2017) . While these parties are still most relevant to
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Liberal Democratic Representation and the Politicization of Religion Interdisciplinary Journal for Religion and Transformation (2018), Heft 7, doi.org/10.14220/jrat.2018.4.issue-2 the formal political system, the dissociation of voters and mainstream parties is growingand results in low turnouts.This is further pushed by dissatisfaction with these established actors.Scholars name aseries of reasonsfor this dissatisfaction, reaching from economic insecurity in apost-industrial economy to powerlessness of political actors in the light of technocracy,supra-national governance and allmightycorporations,and acultural backlash in aretro reaction to societalvalue change (Inglehart and Norris 2016;Cox 2018;T orre 2014).
Such manifold transformation processes allowed populist parties to step in and gain significant success by claiming to speak "for the people",used synonymously for the claim to represent more immediate than mainstream parties.P opulist actors are then oftenp erceiveda sa na lternativet ot he established system of political parties.Populist rhetoric is charged with symbolic references aimed at the stimulation of emotions.Mobilizing fear, nostalgia and aromanticized vision of the nation characterizes the successfuls trategies of right-wing populists across Europe.While theirclaimsare not necessarilyanti-democratic,they usually turn againstthe liberal ideals of freedom and equality.
Populists claim to speakfor the people is increasingly accepted as avalid claim, and their agenda is adopted by mainstream parties (Bale et al. 2010; Gruber and Bale 2014) , resulting in mainstream and right-wing actors who pusha ni lliberal agenda. In fact, as Fielitz and Laloire argue, "illiberal models of democracy", such as in Poland and Hungary,p rove populista ctors "capacity to transform entire political systems" (2016, 15) . It can be reasonably assumed that this relates directly to the crisis of symbolic representation:Dissociation of established party structures,anti-establishment attitudes, political discontent are symptoms of the diminishingm eaningagrowing number of people no longer ascribe to mainstream political representatives.
As Runcimana rgues,r epresentees non objectioni sr equired to allow their presence in absence in processeso fr epresentation. Ad iminishing ascribed symbolic meaning results in an objection that limits this presence.I nt his case, liberal democratic representation foresees to hold representativesa ccountable and replace them. Thec urrent challenging of representationb ya ctors that actually oppose the liberal foundation of contemporary democracies makes evident that this system of representation is unable to protect itself against its abolition (as famously discussed by Böckenförde 1976).
d) Substantive Representation
Substantive representation is expressed in the prioritization of policy preferences of the represented.Here,Michael Sawardsthinking is crucial, as he argues that we cannot simply assume interests are takenfor granted.Hestates that aclaim is not merely representing the interestso ft hose representedb ut that representativeness dependso nt he extent to which ac laim is accepted as being representative and resonates amongthe represented.
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Interdisciplinary Journal for Religion and Transformation (2018), Heft 7, doi.org/10.14220/jrat.2018.4.issue-2 What political analysists oftenoverlookisthat the interests looked at might not be quiteaccurate.For example,being female might not be the group identity that aperson developsher interests upon. As astudy on female Tr ump voters shows, holdingsexist and racist attitudes was more influential to women in their decision to vote for Tr ump than what is understood as gender related interests (Setzlerand Yanus 2018). Also,apolicy mightactually hurt aparticular group but is sold to them as being in their interest. Timothy Snyder speaks of "sadopopulists" (2018), when referring to populist actors who make policiesa gainstt he interest of the people they claim to speak for.
When looking at substantive representation, the critique of Pitkinsapproach becomes most evident. Still, the completed issolution of interestsq uestions democratic representationassuch, therefore Iview (group) interests as heavily influenced by discourses but not as inexistent. Forsome time,strongpartyties and agreater congruency of societalcleavages and political parties aligned interests, representativesclaims and their acceptance.However,asdiscussed above,these societals tructures are increasingly eroding. Thec oncept of democratic representation still builds on theses ocietal structures. Unaligned interests and changing groupi dentifications are ap itfall to the concept of liberal democratic representation and acentral elementinthe crisis of substantive representation.
Thec risis of representation then includes formal aspects with regard to authorization and accountability in democratic entitiesthat exclude more and more people from thesep rocesses.I tf urtherc onstitutes al imited descriptive representation due to the (ongoing) exclusion of people with certainm arkers of differenceand inability of microcosmicreflection of agrowingdiversity.Insymbolic terms,w eo bserve ad issociation of people and established structureso fr epresentation. This relates to the crisis of substantive representation, which results from diverging societal interests and, as revealed by adiscursiveperspective on representation, al imited ability to understand interestsa ss omething given in society instead of something created through representation itself.
Politicized Religion and the Crisis of Representation
In the course of the ongoing,s evere societalt ransformations described above, religion plays ac rucial role in multiplew ays.H aving described the crisis of political representation in more general terms,Iwantt od iscuss recentd evelopments in Austrian politicsonreligion, against the backdrop of these developments in the following. Therefore Ibriefly describe the Austrian case and the empirical studies Id rawo n, followed by ad iscussion of religion and the crisis of representation in Austria.
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Liberal Austriasreligious inclusiveness is arelic from the Hapsburg monarchy,when for tacticalreason, and maybe as well in the spirit of Enlightenment, rather tolerant legislation allowed for religious diversity (Klieber 2010) . After 1945, the Austrian body of law was mostly adopted from the pre-WWII and pre-Austrofascist period. Also,the 1912 Islam Law was still in force when growing religious diversity becamea ni ssue in post-war Austria.Agroup of Muslims founded a Kultusgemeinde in the 1970s,w hich resulted in al egally acknowledged Islamic Religious Community in Austria that became the official representation for Muslims in Austria (Kroissenbrunner 2002) . Until 2013, whenanAlevi religious community was granted the same legal status,itserved as asinglepoint of contact for state actors.
Thei nclusiveness of Austrian state religion relation is not limited to an institutional setting that guarantees ab road set of privileges for 16 legally acknowledgedr eligious communities (see Bundeskanzleramt, Kirchen und Religionsgemeinschaften); it also led to inclusive decision making when it came to issues of religious freedom. Examples for this,could be found when the Muslim headscarf was discussed across Europe in the early 2000s (see Rosenberger and Sauer 2013) , or in the case of male circumcision (Wieshaider 2016) . In these and other cases,coalition governments includingthe populist far right, as well as grand coalitions of Social Democrats (SozialdemokratischePartei Österreichs,SPÖ)and PeoplesParty (Österreichische Volkspartei, ÖVP)refrained from restraining religiousrights.T his tradition of inclusiveness has changed in recent years,inparticularwith regard to Islam (Hafez and Heinisch 2018) . Here,longstanding claims from the far right, such as the ban of face veiling,w ere recently implemented.
This relates to the secondc haracteristic of the particular information-rich Austrian case,astrong and long-established populist right. Unlike Germany, Austria did not go through aphase of severeexamination of its NationalSocialist past, as it was claimed to be "the first victim"ofNazi-aggression (Rathkolb 2015) . This also resulted in the continuedexistenceofapolitical representation of the, traditionally anti-cleric "third camp" 5 .In1949, the Association of Independents 
Empirical Database and Analysis
This paper draws on the empirical work from al arger project on the politics of religion and migration in Austria (Mattes 2017a (Mattes , 2017b (Mattes ,2018 . This project built on four sources of data material:P olicyd ocuments on immigranti ntegration issued in Austria between 2005 and 2013, aformative phase for Austrian immigrant integration policies; Press releases and campaign material in relation to the policy documents were used to complement the picture;Parliamentary protocols allowed the inclusion of data material withinalargerperiod, namely 1993-2013; Fort his article,t he data collection has been further extended to 2017. Finally, qualitative interviews were conductedt ob ring in policy makers and religious representatives voices.
Christian-social, and German-nationalist (Campbell and Gerlich 2000) . Also in post-war Austria, the latter is usually referred to as the "third camp". Policy documents were analysed using qualitative content analysis (Hsieh and Shannon 2005) . Parliamentary protocols were analysed usingasimple version of quantitative content analysis in combination with aq ualitativec ontent analysis (Kelle 2004) . Interview transcripts were analysed using a themed analysis (Froschauer and Lueger 2003) . In the following part of the paper Iwill, though not exclusively,draw on this study to build and underline my argument.
Religion and theCrisis of Representation in Austria
Theguiding question for this paper is how religion relates to the idealisticconcept of liberal democratic representation and its inherent pitfalls,a nd which underlying problems of liberal democratic representation the case of politicizedreligion helps to understand. To answerthis question Iwant to look at the current crisis of representation in Austria and the waysreligionisinvolved in it. Istart by looking at eachaspectofPitkinsconcept of representation and assess religionsgeneral relevance to liberal democratic representation, followed by ad iscussion of elements of politicizations identified in the empirical analysis of the Austrian case.
a) FormalRepresentation
When we look at formal political representation in liberaldemocracies,religion should simply be irrelevant. Religious affiliationi sn ot only protected by antidiscrimination legislature,f reedom of religion is also guaranteed by the commitment to universal human rights and constitutional regulations.I nanarrow understanding of formal representation throughelections,neither authorization nor accountability can be formally based on religious affiliation or attitudes towardsreligion. When we look more closely and apply aslightly wider understanding,wefind that religion can be arelevant factoronaformal level of representation, and in fact for bothrepresentees and representatives.Unlike the liberaldemocratic ideal of strict religion-state separation, many European states installed so called "systems of cooperation" that foresaw privileges and duties of acknowledged communities on aconstitutional level (Minkenberg 2003) . Political scientists like Wayne Hudson (2003) , or Julia Mour¼o Permoser and SieglindeRosenberger for Austria (2009) argue that withinaconcept of multiple citizenships (national, local, EUropean, global, etc.) , what they call "religious citizenship" is oftenoverlooked. While this "religious citizenship" is not alegal status like nationality,membership in ar eligiousc ommunity can open windowso fo pportunity through group representation,also in formal terms.
ForA ustria, Mour¼o Permoser and Rosenbergerargue,t hat due to the Austrian system of cooperativestate-religion relations,religiousmembership is in fact abenefitfor non-citizens.People might be entitled to vote for areligious representative (e.g.i nt he legally acknowledged Islamic and Jewish Communities), despite not being entitled to vote for state representatives.W hile migrants in generald on ot have an official representative channel, they might have one throughtheir religious affiliation.T he systemofcooperation between state and legally acknowledged religious communities foresees consultation of religious organizationsf or all matters of religion politics, and, to al esser extent, also in other legislative procedures."Religious citizenship" entails both alegal form of representation and amore general discursive one.This is especially relevantfor
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On the otherside,there is autilization of religious communities to implement immigrant integration policies,t reating them as representatives of migrants, rather than as religious actors. As discussed by various authors,r eligious communities and Islamic communities in particular, become subject of the practiceof governing through community (Tezcan 2012; Ragazzi 2016) . While for some time in theearly 2000s and especially through amulticulturalism lens,these practices have been assessed as inclusive,the specific politicization of Islam and Muslims,as well as growing resentments among the public and policy makers alike,lead to the assessment that such representation is barely able to lead towards more legitimate authorizationorwider accountability (Mattes 2017a) . As an interviewee from the IslamicR eligious Community in Austria put it:" Eveni nm yo fficial functionI encounter people who really have ah ard time digesting that it is possible to be Muslim and Austrian. Islam is something out of Austria, toleratedinaguest status, at best."(AT2, 04:08)
As it bears the danger of further exclusion Idonot view astronger involvement of religious communitiesasasolution for better formal representation of religious migrants.T he selective process of acknowledgingr eligious communities only considers avery specific sub-group of religiously affiliated people and therefore cannot functiona saw ay to includef oreign citizens. Rather, an individual involvement through the acquisitiono fc itizenship is desirable to improve liberal democratic representation. There are no official numbersofreligious affiliations among migrants and naturalizations.Lookingatthe mostpoliticized example of religious migrants,Muslims in Austria, it is estimated that around50percent of the 700 000 Muslimsl iving in the country hold Austrian citizenship (Hager and Peternel 2018). 6 Obviously,naturalized members of religious minorities are entitled to participate in elections,w hich means that representatives are accountable to them. However, even if religious minorities are involvedinrepresentationprocesses,a minority position in democratic electiononly allows for limited influence.There are various concepts and reform ideas to improve minority representation, reaching from affirmative actiont oq uotas, but all of them bear the danger to undermine the liberalfocus on the individual. In fact, representative democracyis conceptualized to avoid the "tyranny of the masses", as representatives are supposed to act in the democratic interest of minority representation. In light of the currentpoliticization of religion -Christianity and Islam as markers for self-and otherness -t he extent to which representatives fulfill this task is questionable.
6T here are no estimations of the shareo fA ustrian citizensa mongt he 500 000 orthodox Christians and around 15 000 Jews living in Austria (Goujon, Jurasszovich, and Potančokovµ 2017).
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b) Descriptive Representation
Descriptive representation is,asargued by Young, apotential source for democratic representationt hat aims towards justice (2002, 82) . But to what extent is religion relevantfor descriptive representation?Asreligion is atypical category of difference, it is regularlydiscussed with regards to descriptive representation. Young differentiates between culturaland structural differences and would, in the first place,view religion as acultural difference,asopposed to astructural one like gender,sexual orientation and race.For Europe, scholarly literature increasingly assesses ar acialization of religion and Islam in particular.A sF atimaE l-Tayeb argues,i naEuropeanc ontextw here race is ah istoric societal taboo, veiled Muslim women become the visible other to the essentially white European self (El-Tayeb 2011, 16) .
In addition to whether difference is cultural or structural, we can look at the perception and presentation of difference.W hile many members of Austrian parliament are religiously affiliated,v ery few make their religious position explicit. Assessing the composition of the Austrian National Assembly in the XXVI legislative period (which began in 2017 and does not significantly differf rom former periods), four among the five members with amigration background have roots in Muslim-majorityr egions (Draxler and Schaffer 2017) . None of them presents him/herself as adevout believerorclaimstostand for Muslims in Austria. Some explicitly see themselves as secular or not practicingMuslims (Pink 2008; Rajkovic 2017) ;anotherMuslimparliamentarian explicitly states his skepticism about the relation of religion and politicsi ng eneral( D önmez 2017). There are two Jewish members of parliament, one of them claimstobethe first "active Jew" in post-war Austrian Parliament (kurier.at 2017). With regard to different Christian representatives,one way to assess theirpresence is the affiliationofMPs with Christiano rganizations( see webpage Meine Abgeordneten) but only few Christian parliamentarians proactively communicate their religious affiliation.
Findings from the "Giving Voice Project"that investigated descriptive representation in Austrian parliament show that religion, mingledwith the label"immigrant background", is adoublee dged sword.W hile religious affiliation is increasingly pointed out among male candidates of Tu rkish origin, other candidates (especially Muslim women who do not wearaheadscarf) are perceivedand addressed as religious candidatestoalesser extent (Rosenberger and Stöckl 2016) . Instead of standingf or Muslims in Austria, thesec andidates aimedt ob ep erceived as party representatives.Even if political actors of aparticular faith would want to stand for the religious community, it would be unclear whose religion they represent, as spectrums of religiosity reach from secular affiliation to active practice and devout dedication. Descriptive religious representation, then, is limited to singler epresentatives,w ho explicitlyc laim standing for very specific groups.
Rather than looking at descriptive likeliness in relation to substantive interest representation, we can assess the relevance of the presence of minority characteristicsamong representatives parallel to Michelle L. Swers findings on womens representation (2002): Presence of especially marginalizedr eligious people is crucialt or aise the responsiveness to minorityi nterest on am ore generall evel, and can include these marginalizedp eoplei nto the circle of those perceiveda s able to rule.
c) Symbolic Representation
Ther elevance of religion for symbolicr epresentationr elates closely to the problemofdiverse groups and homogenous labels.According to Pitkinsconcept, symbolic representation considers the role of "irrational belief" and "the importance of pleasing onesconstituency" (1967, 111) . Descriptivelikeliness might occur,b ut representation also requires the representedt ov iew the representatives as standing for them.I nr ecent years,r eligion played an increasing role in both the "irrational beliefs" of voters and the attempts to please them by representatives.
Accordingt os urveys,t he shareo fp eople who view Austria as a" Christian country" is high, at about 76 %(IMAS 2016, 3). Recent numbers from astudy on Christians in Western Europe show that while 80 percent view themselves as Christian, only 30 percent go to church from time to time or regularly (Pew Research Center 2018). 39 percent even stated that one needs to be Christiantobe "one of us" (ibid.). Christianr eligious representation then seems to be not so much about descriptive likeliness but about symbolic representation and the "irrational belief" relatedtoit.
Thepoliticization of religious symbols functions as aprime example.Inmany European states,among them Austria, full-face veiling has been legally banned. Despite minimal numbers of women wearing this particular clothing,the measure has been argued to be integrative and necessary to stop "counter-society" (Marchart 2016 ). In the courseo ft he same legal brief,r eligious symbols for magistratesi nc ourt were to be dismissed 7 ,b ut the government representatives immediately stressed, that this would not concern the crucifixes, whicha re installed in Austrian court rooms.Despite rapidly shrinkingnumbers of practicing Christians in Austria, the crucifix in public places like courts and schoolshas been heatedly debated and representatives mostly favor or refrainfrom opposing their presence.C urrentV ice-Chancellor Heinz-Christian Strache, from the far right and-populist Austrian Freedom Party,f amously held as peech against "Islamization", holding ac rucifix in his hand and publicly talked about his Catholic confirmation at thea ge of 39 (derstandard.at2 009). Here,r eligion becomes a 7I nthe end, this measure was not introduced by law,but through an executive order. symbolt op leasev oters and serve the irrationalb elieve that religion relates to belonging.
Sawardsfocus on the discursive constructionofmeaning,and in particular the concept of boundarydrawing, helps to assess this symbolic level of representation. Symbolic boundaries are conceptualdistinctions that social actors implement to separate people into groupsa nd generate feelings of similaritya nd group membership (Lamontand Molnµr2002, 168) and these examples for the current politicizationofreligiondemonstrate its functioning.
In theory,t he usage of religion for symbolic boundary drawing puts liberal democratic actors in ad ilemma, as they commit to state neutrality (Madeley 2003) . However,d rawing on religion for boundary-making is in practice not limited to Austriasfar right populist representatives.Asshown in other studies on mainstream integration policies,what it means "to be Austrian"isoften linked to Christianity, which is presented as the source of liberalism and secularism (Mattes 2017b) .Anextreme example from an Austrian policy document states:
This statementisfollowed by adiscussion of Austrian values,alisting of liberal norms.Onthe basicprinciple of equality the documentstates:
"The principle of equality derives from statements of the Old and especially the New Te stament, that all men are equal before God." (BMI 2008, p. 20) This raises thequestiontowhich extent symbolic representation for non-Christians is in possible,i fl egitimate representation is,i nt he current climate of politicized religion, discursively linked to aChristian character of representees.The electoral success of those representatives who engage in symbolic boundary drawingonreligion allows the assumption that the meaning representees ascribe to representatives is equally dominated by the othering of Islam and Muslims.
d) Substantive Representation
Substantive representation relates to the contentso fp olitical representation, which frequently involvereligion in many ways.Above,Idiscussed the difficulties of unaligned interests for the purpose of representation. As becameevident in the discussiono fs ymbolic representation and as frequently discussed by political scientists,identity politics is becomingasocietal cleavage along which some political representatives increasingly align themselves (Bale 2017) . While it is discussed whether identity conflicts replacee conomic conflicts or disguise them, their current predominance severely affectss ubstantive representation.T he alignment of representatives along cleavages of identity politics also involves a
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This can be demonstrated when looking at claims about Islam and Muslimsin Austrian parliament.W hen askingw ho makes claimsa bout Muslims,a nd what the content of thesec laims is,r esults from al ong-term study,t hat investigated Islam in immigrant integration policy debates in the Austrian National Assembly from 1993 onwards,show the processes of alignment alongthe cleavage of identity politics.
Theoverall development of average claims made per session (Fig1)shows an unsteady picture.W hile in 2001, the year the terror attacks of 9/11 were committed, asmall peak is observable,the years that followeddid not experience a significant politicization of Islam and Muslims.O nlyi n2 006/2007 much higher numbers of claims made are observable,r eaching up to 11 claimsp er parliamentary session. This 2007 peak was not observed in the following years,when, on average2-3 claims were made.
It is worth splitting up these results with regard to political parties to see which actors make these claims.B etween four and six parties held seats in Austrian parliament. Thetraditionally largemainstream parties are the Social-Democratic Party (SPÖ)a nd the Christian-democraticP eoplesP arty (ÖVP). Since 1986 Since (until 2017 In 2001 (Fig. 2) , we observesubstantive representation of Islam as an issue for niche parties.W hile the far right pushedt he debate about Islam with security claims,the Green party called for diversification.Both "niche parties" on the left and right could have benefited from the politicization of the issue (Gruber 2014 ).
In 2007 (Fig. 3) , when the far right (the Austrian Freedom Party and theirsplit-off BZÖ)decided to put anti-Islam rhetoric at the center of their voter mobilization strategies , their sharec limbedu pt o7 5 percentofthe claims of amuch higher total(as seen in Fig. 1 ).
In 2015 (Fig.4) , the populist far right no longer madeanabsolute majority of claims (33 percent), but the Christian-democratic ÖVP (32 percent) and the liberal NEOS (28 percent)e ach have as imilar sized share.T he Austrian SocialDemocratic Party (5 percent) and the Greens (1 percent) hardlymade any claims on Islam/Muslims anymore.
Over the years,wesee adevelopment from niche,tofar right, to mainstream. Politicizationstarted as aniche party phenomenon (2001), was then pushed by the far right (2007) and resultedinpoliticization throughout the rightofthe political spectrum (2015) .
To provideinformationonthe content of these claims,the data was also coded with regardstothe issues addressed. Through inductive category development, six .Ifwelook at the issues addressed (Fig. 5) , we see that populist far rightc laims( FPÖ/BZÖ)f ocused on security (36 percent) and values (33 percent), to al esser extent on establishment issues (thenu sually directed towards the withdrawal of rights). Overall, the ÖVP made most of their claimsondifferentiation (26 percent), followed by values (22).18percent of the partysclaims were made on establishment and dialogue.Social-Democrats made 46 percent of their claims on differentiation, followed by establishment and values (15 percente ach). TheG reenP arty focused on differentiation (56 percent) or general issues of integration. Tw op arties were in parliament only for the last legislative period under observation (2013) (2014) (2015) (2016) (2017) and show very different patterns.T eam Stronachsclaim-making resemblesthe far right pattern, focusing on security (47 percent) and values(30 percent). Theliberal NEOS focused on differentiation (36 percent), establishment (32 percent)and values (18 percent).
If we mergethese results (Fig.6 )and look at the overall claims-making, we see distinct patterns.F irst, the far right (FPÖ and BZÖ)d ominated the debatea nd made,overall, 62 percent of the claims during the 20 year period of observation. All otherparties played amuch smaller role,they made less claims and if they did, they addressed different issues.T he left pushedf or differentiation,b ut in the overall picture,these claims played aminor role.
Whilet he study is not suitable to assess the role of religion for substantive representationassuch, the empirical data clearly shows an interest alignment on the right of the political spectrum alongthe lines of religiousidentity politics over the past years.R ather than arguing that it is in Christians interest to claim the exclusion of Islam and Muslims, as the populistf ar right suggests,w eh ave to deployS awardsp erspective on discursive representation: Interests are never essential;t hey are not something that is just there,w aiting to be picked up by political representatives but something that is both produced and reproduced in the process of representation. Theb oundary drawing against Muslims is also therefore an interestthat is discursively produced, resonates among representees and is again representedbypolitical actors.
Equality might be the liberalg oal, but it is inequality that many voters are callingfor.P opulist actors are willing to represent this call for inequality and, at 
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Liberal Democratic Representation and the Politicization of Religion Interdisciplinary Journal for Religion and Transformation (2018), Heft 7, doi.org/10.14220/jrat.2018.4.issue-2 the same time,promote the exclusionary and often racist ideas behind it. Among representatives of other parties,weobserve three strategies: First, some left wing actors might oppose the right-wingp opulists argument directly,a st he Green party did in the early 2000s.Secondly,they might adopt the right-wing populists argument, as the ÖVP has done in recent years.F inally,they might refrain from engaging in the debate, as the SPÖ has done in recent years (and to alesserextent the Green Party). So far,right-wing populists seem to benefit from each of these strategies,asthe first one createsabroader politicization, the second allows for the implementation of measures through coalitions and the third enables the attraction of votersthat are concerned by the issue and feel theirformer representatives are not providing solutions.T ogether,t hese strategies result in the alignment of representatives on the right, along an identity politicscleavage.
ACrisis of Liberalism, Not aCrisis of Democracy?T owards a Conclusion
Theabove discussion of empirical resultsshowsusthat the politicization of (religious) difference is closely related to the current crisis of representation in its different facets.F ormal representationdepends on participation, whichrequires both the willingness and the ability of the population to participate in authorization and accountability processes.T his is currently challenged by growing numbers of foreign citizenswho are not entitled to vote and low turnouts among those who hold citizenship.Religiouscitizenship,aconcept described as bringing privileges to the religiously affiliated, evenifthey do not hold citizenship,isnot a viable alternative as it bears the danger of exceptionalization and exclusion. Descriptive representation is challengedb ys ocietal diversification on the one hand, and the questionable essentialcharacter of societal groups on the other.The extent,towhich descriptive representation is possible,depends on the formation of societalgroups and their acceptance among the wider population. Thepoliticizationofreligion means that representatives who belong to religious minorities are in adifficult situation, as they are asked to stand for areligious community, while at the samet ime being confronted with al acking acceptance of their affiliation. Symbolic representation, the meaning ascribed to representatives,also faces the problem of increasingly exclusionary tendencies.Here,religionisamong the central elements representatives use to draw symbolic boundaries that resonate amongt heir voters. This relates to substantive representation which is challengedbythe dissolvingsocietal cleavages and unalignedinterests.The now observable alignment of interestsa long an identity politics cleavage involves religion and bears the danger to allowf or at yrannyo ft he masses,s omething liberaldemocratic representation is supposed to prevent. Political liberalism namesequality and freedom as the basis for ajust system and only operatesw ithin thesel imits.I nt he lighto fp olitical representation it becomes ever more evident that this principle of equality is under distress.Equal representation for all, by all and of all is questioned not only at the intersectionof religion and migration but in more general terms.AsKemmers et al. impressively demonstrate for people with anti-establishment attitudes in the Netherlands, explaining their behaviort hroughd eviance or viewing them as "losers of modernity" only works so far.R ather, the qualitative studys hows that people con-
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Liberal Democratic Representation and the Politicization of Religion Interdisciplinary Journal for Religion and Transformation (2018), Heft 7, doi.org/10.14220/jrat.2018.4.issue-2 sciously develop such attitudes,which involves "a profound change of their ideas on, and subsequent evaluation of,t he workings of politics and society" (2016, 768) . As the aforementioned studyonfemale Trump voters shows,holding sexist and racist attitudes was more influential to women in their decision to vote than the gender specific interests they were expected to vote on (Setzler and Yanus 2018) .
Theu npleasant part for those in favor of liberal democracy, which definitely includes the majority of Europespolitical elites,isthat the representationmade by the populist rightand demanded by their voters is not undemocratic, it is just not liberal. Following the logic of political system centereda pproaches to representation, makingtheseinterests present in the political arena is still ademocratic act. Thec onstructivistsp erspective would add that thesei nterestsa re equallyproduced instead of just adopted and might lead to different conclusions. Together, both perspectivesallow the assessment of the crisis of political representation, which seemstobe, first and foremost, acrisis of competing norms and the turn against liberalism. Yascha Mounk argues that liberalism and democracy do not fit togetherasnaturally as many people,and experts,believe."Thewill of the people increasingly goes against the rule of law and dissolve liberal democracy." 9 (2018, 116 f) While Idonot share his perceptionofthe peopleswill, as Iam with Sawardsc onception of interests,M ounk makes an important point regardingthe concepts of liberalism and democracy. Thesuccess story of the liberal ideal to maximize freedom and equality goes hand in hand with democratization process in manyplaces.They are however, not inextricablylinked.
As Iargued in this paper, liberal democratic representation is currently under multiple pressures.Itisliberalismthat is under attack, as well as the specific form of representation that then ormativec oncept of liberalism demands. Illiberal forms of democracya re possible and in fact currently observable in European states like Hungaryand Poland. Thequestion of how to prevent other countries, like Austria, from this development is morethan pressing and for sure thereare no simple solutions.Ade-politicization of religion seems crucial, as liberal democracysa bility to functiono ng roup representation is limited. Both equality and freedomare first and foremost norms for the individual. In the politicization of religion, inequality is fosteredo nt he basis of group affiliation. Liberal democracies,therefore,require ajugglingact to balance the two.Illiberal actors who are not interested in holdingupthat balance have an easy game.Some scholars then point at rule of law and the justice system as as ecurity mechanism in liberal democracy. In my view,t his is not sufficient. Liberal democracyh as to be won discursivelythrough the better argument and claimsthat resonate.These have to includeplausibleplaces for religion in society that allow for the normalization of religious diversity.
9T ranslated by the author.
